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Convening at a time when the existing crisis in the law of the
sea is viewed by many Third World decision-makers as only one
symptom of a more far-reaching convulsion in the structure of in-
ternational economic relationships, the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea underscored the necessity of exam-
ining different objectives and approaches and translating such into
enduring legal norms. In the characterization of many Third World
decision-makers this Conference constitutes a significant develop-
ment in their efforts to humanize and rationalize the prevailing
structures of international economic relationships by making a tra-
ditionally obsolescent and intransigent jurisprudence, which de-
termines both their parameters and content, more responsive to the
needs and aspirations of the world's deprived nations. To a consid-
erable extent this task has been expressed to be defined, on the
one hand, by the Declaration of Principles embodied in General As-
sembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) and in various other resolutions of
* Leader of Guyana delegation to the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (Caracas 1974). Formerly Counsellor of Legal Affairs, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Guyana (1971-74), Mr. Pollard is currently Di-
rector of Legal Affairs for International Bauxite Association.
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the United Nations concerning the inherent right of all States to
the exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.
On the other hand this task is likely to be informed by the objec-
tive conditions of disarray currently manifesting themselves in the
international legal order-a disarray which has invariably accom-
panied any period of transition of a nature and magnitude to which
present developments in international relations bear witness.
This transition in the structuring of international relationships
has been characterized by insistent demands for a movement away
from elitism in the institutional processes of normative decision-
making and has in large measure been occasioned by the phe-
nomenal enlargement of the international community within recent
times and the consequent augmentation of claims demanding recog-
nition and status in the emerging legal order. Undoubtedly, efforts
in this direction are made extremely difficult by simultaneous de-
velopments of a revolutionary nature in several areas of human
endeavour. For whether or not one is prepared to recognize it, the
fact is that modern man stands at the point of convergence of sev-
eral revolutionary developments. Energizing this process of radical
transformation is the ongoing revolution in science and technology,
which, in addition to bringing about drastic changes in man's self-
concept has revolutionized his relationship to the universe. By rev-
olutionizing systems of communication in spatial and temporal
terms it has occasioned a revolution of rising expectations among
the world's deprived nations and, more so, among the deprived of
those nations themselves. By enhancing man's capacity to explore
and exploit his immediate surroundings it has operated to make
scarcity and the degradation of the environment a general attribute
of human endeavour while accelerating the drive of Third World
decision-makers towards a more meaningful participation in the
management and allocation of the world's resources. By intensify-
ing man's exploitive drive towards outer space it has revolutionized
concepts of military strategy and dramatically underscored the sig-
nificance of inner space as a critical dimension in strategic planning.
And it is against this background of developments that objectives
sought to be secured must be analyzed.
In attempting to determine developments in the law of the sea,
good sense would appear to advise that competent decision-makers
should seek to ensure that the legal order likely to emerge from
the continuing dialogue between advocates of various conflicting
claims respond to the demands of inclusive and exclusive interests.
As such, even though attempts to have recognition and preferment
of exclusive claims are to be expected, the temptation must be re-
sisted to espouse extreme particularistic interests which may only
complicate the process of parametric adjustment of interests on
which all enduring law must ultimately be predicated. Above all,
attempts must be made to temper idealism with realism in the can-
did recognition that perfection is an attribute of divinity and that,
as is often the case with ordinary mortals, human expectations ig-
nore at their peril the reality of constraints which often operate
to emasculate desired objectives. On the other hand, as experience
has shown, an inordinately positivistic approach may induce an un-
warranted tendency to designate attempts to restructure the pre-
vailing system of international relationships in ocean space as both
a disingenuous exercise in radical economic opportunism and a sim-
plistic approach to the problems of collective security through reli-
ance on generally accepted notions of fairness, equity and respect
for divergent national value systems, rather than on the employ-
ment of sophisticated technologies of violence.
For some modern disciples of Metternich1 the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea marks a critical stage in
modern multilateral diplomacy-not so much for the definitive
resolution of fundamental issues of substance uniting or dividing
participants irrespective of historical alliances or ideological pre-
dispositions, but because this Conference, by its near-universality
in terms of national participation, is expressed to be decisive in
determining the modalities on international decision-making in the
future. Failure by this Conference to accommodate the legitimate
interests of all States as well as those of the international com-
munity (conceived in a highly subjectivist sense) by reference to
current realities and, in particular, the inescapable fact of power
differentials, would signal the end of attempts by the older mem-
bers of the international community to seek accommodation of
competing exclusive and inclusive claims by the conference ap-
proach. More damaging, it is being urged, such failure would assist
the petrification of disquieting trends towards elitism and corridor
diplomacy in international decision-making. In the present submis-
1. Consider the reaction of Prince Metternich of Austria to the proposal
of Czar Alexander VI of Russia during the early 19th century to establish
an orderly European state system based on an appeal to love rather than
on an arbitrary, intermittent resort to violence in E. Lnpsox, EuRoPE XN THE
19TH CF UNwy 16 (2d ed. 1948); also D. THoM psoN, EuRoP. Sinc. NAPOLEAN
76 (2d ed. 1962).
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sion, however, this argument ignores one basic reality and eschews
coming to grips with one salient sociological fact. The reality which
appears to be ignored is the need on the part of the technologically-
advanced countries to recognize the growing sophistication of
developing countries in identifying and evaluating events of global
significance by reference to their own systems of values. The socio-
logical fact eschewed is the increasing demands normally placed on
the capacity and ability of competent decision-makers in any given
socio-political context in terms of analyzing, evaluating and deter-
mining preferred objectives in an optional situation whenever the
level of rival decision-makers rises quantitatively or qualitatively,
or both, or whenever the competing claims seeking recognition and
preferment increase in diversity or complexity. To take up one's
marbles and go home in such a situation is tantamount to conceding
defeat before the battle is fully joined-a concession which, at
worst, suggests recognition of an incapacity or inability to perform,
and at best, an unwillingness fo test the extreme limits of that
capacity or ability, as the case may be, in a competitive/problematic
situation.
In the context of the current deliberations at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea decisions may be ex-
pected to materialize only after painstaking and enervating endeav-
ours. Instant accommodation of conflicting interests is as likely
to be an unwarranted expectation as it is likely to be ephemeral
in results if it is in fact achieved. The outer limit of plausible ex-
pectations may be unsatisfactory compromises reflecting a tolerable
mix of achievement and failure on the part of any interest group-
and the prospect of total failure to reach accommodation on any
or all of the issues of vital national and international concern must
always remain a viable reality. This is so because of the context
in which the present deliberations are being conducted-the known
resource potential of the oceans in a planet of dwindling and im-
minently exhaustible land-based resources; the apparently irrecon-
cilable claims of technological advancement and environmental in-
tegrity; the challenge presented to the traditional hegemonistic sys-
tem based on the arbitrary and sometimes indiscriminate employ-
ment of force by current demands for a rationally structured world
economic order and the attendant difficulties experienced by afflu-
ent State systems in adjusting to the emergent economic national-
ism of deprived nations; the intransigence of the applicable norma-
tive system in the face of the increasing assertiveness by the
advocates of a more responsive and relevant jurisprudence; appre-
hensions born of contraints sought to be imposed on ocean-going
military vessels at a time when naval strategy is expressed to be a
critical dimension in maintaining the so-called nuclear deterrent
balance.
Indeed, the problems posed by the foregoing considerations are
not likely to be attenuated by the prevailing energy crisis, persist-
ent instability in the international monetary system and an impend-
ing food crisis coincident with vertiginous increases in world popu-
lation and intractable poverty in the territories of many Third
World decision-makers. And even though the clairvoyance of hind-
sight does appear to advise circumspection in assessing the prospects
of accommodating the conflicting economic, political, military/stra-
tegic and ecological interests of States, both individually and collec-
tively, the experience of the first substantive session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea leaves some room
for cautious optimism that consensus would emerge on the major
issues requiring examination and determination. In the present
submission the concept of the economic zone of exclusive coastal
State jurisdiction appears to offer the most realistic option around
which to build that much-to-be-desired consensus.2
II. THE CONcEPT OF THE ExcLusnm EcoNoMIc ZONE
Despite bold assertions to the contrary the concept of an eco-
nomic zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction is not unknown
to modem international law of the sea. What is new is the choice
of terminology employed to describe the concept and its identifica-
tion with the countries of the Third World. As with the develop-
ment of other norms relating to State interaction in ocean space,
the concept of the exclusive economic zone reflects the "interplay
of economic, political and strategic interests which characterizes the
problems of the law of the sea in the twentieth century.' 4 This
concept as it was originally enunciated defined the considered re-
sponse of competent decision-makers in the United States to the
2. See the Statement of the Representative of Guyana U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.26, at 21 (1974).
3. See the Statement of the Representative of Trinidad & Tobago at the
Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.11/SR.22,
at 28 (1974); also the United States, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24, at 12(1974); Zaire, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62C.2/SR.22, at 15 (1974); Congo, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 17 (1974); Barbados, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.2/SR.22, at 19 (1974); Ukranian S.S.R., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25,
at 21 (1974); Haiti, .U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at 14 (1974).
4. See D.W. Bow r, LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1967).
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challenge presented by the economic and strategic significance of
hydrocarbons as vindicated in the second World War as well as by
an advancing technology which made their exploitation on the con-
tinental shelf both desirable and feasible. In articulating this re-
sponse the third preambular paragraph of the Truman Declaration
(1945) asserted that "jurisdiction over these resources (petroleum
and other minerals) is required in the interest of their conservation
and prudent utilization when and as development is undertaken." 5
The dispositive paragraph of this Declaration, in unilaterally assert-
ing a claim to "the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of
the continental shelf," made it quite clear that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the United States to affect "the character as
high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right
to their free and unimpeded navigation ...." By any criterion of
assessment it would be difficult to deny that the claim advanced
by President Truman on behalf of the Government of the United
States in respect of the non-living resources of the continental shelf
(subsequently defined as encompassing submerged land areas up
to a maximum depth of 200 metres) was a claim to an economic
zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction.
In point of fact article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf (1958) which belatedly extended juridical validity
to what was originally an arbitrary and exaggerated unilateral
claim to jurisdiction over vast expanses of ocean space adjacent to
the coasts of the United States, expressly recognizes the exclusivity
of the coastal State's economic rights on the continental shelf by
providing that
[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive
in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the conti-
nental shelf or exploit its national resources, no one may undertake
these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without
the express consent of the coastal State.6
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, it is fair to say that the
doctrine of the economic zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction
found its most articulate and definitive expression for the first time
in the Declaration of Santo Domingo (1972). 7 At the time of its
5. NomvLAN J. PADELroRD, Puaim c Poiacy roR Tm SEAS 75-76 (Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology revised ed. 1969).
6. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
7. The text of this Declaration approved by the Meeting of Ministers
of the Specialized Conference of the Caribbean Countrieq on problems of
enunciation the Latin American States were hopelessly split among
moderates and extremists, the one advocating a territorial sea of
12 nautical miles and the other a territorial sea of 200 nautical miles
as measured from the applicable baselines.8 During the period im-
mediately following the Santo Domingo Declaration it was some-
what difficult to distinguish with certainty the substantive posi-
tions of the moderates and extremists of Latin America. For,
whereas the former claimed a territorial sea of only 12 nautical
miles, they insisted on exercising exclusive economic jurisdiction in
an area beyond the territorial sea up to an outer limit of 200 nauti-
cal miles. On the other hand, although the extremists insisted on
a territorial sea of 200 miles it was not a territorial sea conceptual-
ized in the traditional sense. It was in fact a territorial sea with
a differential juridical content, the first twelve miles of which were
assimilated to the territorial sea in the traditional sense and the
remaining one hundred and eighty-eight virtually indistinguishable
in juridical configuration from the corresponding area in the patri-
monial sea. It is believed in some quarters that the designation
"patrimonial sea" which was employed in the Santo Domingo Decla-
ration as well as the content of this concept were intended to afford
the extremists of Latin America a plausible opportunity to abandon
their verbal extremism and to embrace the language of moderation
without significantly compromising positions of principle or policy.
The debates at the first substantive session of the Conference in
Caracas revealed, however, that the differences between the mod-
erates and extremists of Latin America were more substantive than
terminological or methodological.
It was therefore left to the Third World countries of Africa, spear-
headed by Kenya and Tanzania, to embrace and adopt the terms
''economic zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction" or "exclusive
economic zone" to describe the area beyond the territorial sea as
enunciated in the Santo Domingo Declaration. 10 The term gained
wider currency on the African continent after the Organization of
African Unity endorsed it and made its substantive content the
the Sea which convened on June 7, 1972, in Santo Domingo may be found
in 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, at 70, U.N. Doe. A/8721 (1972).
8. The main advocates of a territorial sea of 200 miles are Brazil, Uru-
guay, El Salvador, Peru and Ecuador. A discernible shift in position has
occurred in the case of Panama, Argentina and Chile.
9. See, e.g., the Kenyan proposal on the exclusive economic zone con-
tained in 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, at 180, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.11/L.10
(1972); also the Conclusions of the Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea
held in Yaounde from June 20-30, 1972 in U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/79 (1972).
10. See section entitled "Patrimonial Sea" of the Declaration. See also
the 14 power proposal introduced during the debates 9f the Seab~ed Conupit-
tee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/5c ll/L.40,
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principal objective to be achieved by its members at the current
negotiations on the law of the sea.1 1 In Asia its growing acceptance
was in greater evidence after the fifteenth session of the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee which convened in Tokyo
(1974).
An examination of the records of the debates at the recently con-
cluded session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea in Caracas, and in particular those of Committee 11,12
would show that a significant majority of participants endorsed the
concept of an economic zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdic-
tion.13 These endorsements are no clear indication, however, that
the concept is likely to gain general acceptance and find expression
as a positive norm in a general multilateral convention on the law
of the sea. In the first place, many participants have endorsed the
concept subject to qualifications which its principal advocates find
unacceptable; secondly, and even more important, is the fact that
there is still no agreement on the definitive juridical content of
the concept among those States' representatives which have en-
dorsed it.
Adverting now to the qualifications attaching to the acceptance
of the doctrine of the exclusive economic zone, it is important to
note that several delegates expressly recognized an inseparable con-
nection between a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and an exclu-
sive economic zone contiguous thereto and extending to a seaward
limit of 200 nautical miles.1 4 In short, their acceptance of a terri-
11. See Draft Declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers of the
OAU in U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/33 (1974).
12. The Conference set up three committees of the whole-Committee I
to deal with the regime and international machinery to be applied in the
areas of ocean space beyond national jurisdiction. Committee II to deal
with questions related to the structure of the regime within national juris-
diction, and Committee MI to deal with the questions of relating to the pres-
entation of the marine environment, scientific research and the transfer of
technology.
13. It has been estimated that more than 100 states out of a total of 149
represented at the Conference had openly endorsed the concept subject.
14. Consider, for example, the Guyana proposal contained in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/25 (1974) and the statements of that representative in U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.2, at 2 (1974) and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.3,
at 13 and 14 (1974). See also the statements of the following representa-
tives: Honduras, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.3 (1974); Pakistan, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.4, at 7 (1974); Guatemala, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.2/SR.4, at 10 (1974); Tongo, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.4, at 12 (1974);
MexicQ, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 6 (1974); Congo, U.N. Doc. A/
torial sea of 12 nautical miles is expressed not to be in the nature
of an opinio juris but rather as an attempt to accommodate particu-
laristic interests in national security, economic development, envi-
ronmental integrity and inclusive community interests in unim-
peded passage of commercial vessels on the world's oceans. The
powerful maritime nations for their part would recognize the con-
cept of an economic zone conditional on the acceptance of a narrow
territorial sea, freedom of navigation and overflight through and
over straits used for international navigation, "freedom of scientific
research, determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf,
the seabed regime and the prevention of pollution of the sea envi-
ronment." Postulated in other terms, these issues are conceived
as constituting "a package deal" that must be resolved altogether.'5
In addition, it is urged that any satisfactory solution to the whole
range of issues relating to the law of the sea must provide for com-
pulsory third party adjudication of disputes arising from the inter-
pretation and application of any instrument to be elaborated. For
some of the so-called geographically disadvantaged States, 10 al-
though the doctrine of the exclusive economic zone left much to
be desired in terms of a satisfactory resolution of the problems at-
tending the exploitation of living resources in ocean space beyond
the territorial seas, it could, however, be rendered palatable by the
recognition of a right of access by States whose adjacent ocean
spaces are generously endowed with living resources to geograph-
ically disadvantaged States within a given region. 17 Other States
would only accept the doctrine subject to the proviso that nationals
of foreign States would be recognized as having a right to exploit
the living resources of the zone in cases where the coastal State
concerned is incapable of fully exploiting those resources' 8 or pro-
vided that the exclusive economic zone would not be so extensive
CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 17 (1974); Kenya, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.23, at
6 (1974). See also the Spanish proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.6
(1974); and the Nicaraguan proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.17 (1974).
15. Consider, for example, the six-power proposal in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.38 (1974); also the statements of the following representatives:
Trinidad & Togago, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 28 (1974); Finland,
U.N. A/CONF.62/SR22, at 34 (1974); Mexico, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
SR.22 at 6 (1974); United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.72/C.2/SR.25, at 19
et seq. (1974); Guatemala, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at 20 (1974).
16. For a definition of this concept, see the Jamaican proposal contained
in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.30 (1974).
17. See Statements of the Representatives of Jamaica, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/SR.28, at 6 (1974); Cuba, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24, at 17,
18 (1974); Trinidad & Tobago, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 28
(1974); Barbados, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 20 (1974).
18. See Statement of the Representatives of Australia, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.26, at 11; the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
SR. 22, at 19; Spain, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2./SR.27, at 19; Ireland, U.N.
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as to render the international area economically unviable.19 Some
land-locked States expressed reservations about the doctrine but in-
timated their readiness to accept it provided that transit coastal
States were prepared to guarantee them access to the sea and to
the living resources of their exclusive economic zones. 20
In terms of the juridical content of the doctrine of the exclusive
economic zone one need only remark on the relevance of the apho-
rism quot homines tot sententiae in the present context. 21 As far
as the resources of the zone are concerned, the main advocates of
the doctrine seem to be agreed that the coastal State must be recog-
nized as enjoying sovereign rights for the purposes of their explora-
tion and exploitation. 22  It does appear to follow, too, that these
rights are to be exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does
not exploit the resources of this zone no other State can, except
with the express prior consent of the coastal State.23 Within the
Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.22, at 32 (1974); and generally the U.S. proposal, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974), and the six-power proposal, supra note
15.
19. See Statement of the Representative of Singapore, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/SR.27, at 2 (1974); and Bhutan, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2//SR.25, at
23 (1974).
20. Consider, for example, the proposal co-sponsored by Afghanistan,
Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Finland, Iraq, Laos, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherland, Paraguay, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia contained in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.39 (1974); see also the Statements of the Representatives
of Upper Volta, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 10 (1974); Uganda,
U.N. Doc. A/CQNF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 11 (1974); 'Bolivia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2ISR.25, at 14 (1974);.
21. See Statements of Representatives of Uruguay, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/SR.26, at 23 (1974); Ecuador, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at
13 (1974).
22. See the Santo Domingo Declaration; also the proposal in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/L.4 (1974); and the Statement of the Representatives of Yugo-
slavia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 9 (1974); Kenya, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.23, at 5 (1974); Peru, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24, at
21 (1974).
23. See, e.g., the Kenyan proposal in 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, at 170,
U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972), and the 14 power proposal in U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/
SC.11/L.40 (1972) which were introduced in the Seabed Committee and the
Nigerian proposal contained in U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.21 (1974) (art.
1). In introducing his proposal the Nigerian Representative communicated
his willingness to agree to an additional provision in the text that would
allow access under license to the living resources of the economic zone
where these resources were not fully utilized. See also Statements of the
Representatives of Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 17 (1974);
Pakistan, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 3 (1974); Rep. of Korea, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 16 (1974); United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 19 (1974).
exclusive economic zone the coastal State would have the right to
regulate scientific research 24 and to take measures to prevent pollu-
tion of the marine environment. In the exclusive economic zone
there would be freedom of navigation and overflight as well as free-
dom to lay pipelines and submarine cables. Some uncertainty ap-
pears to exist, however, regarding the other rights which the coastal
State is to be recognized as enjoying in the exclusive economic
zone.25 Thus article 1 (d) of the Nigerian proposal would also recog-
nize the coastal State as having "exclusive jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of protection, prevention and regulation of other matters ancil-
lary to the rights and competences aforesaid and, in particular, the
prevention and punishment of infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territorial sea and
economic zone." In short, the Nigerian proposal would recognize
the coastal State as enjoying within the exclusive economic zone
those competences which it enjoys in the contiguous zone under
traditional international law. 26 The Santo Domingo Declaration
does not match the Nigerian proposal in terms of specificity in this
regard but it does provide that those international freedoms which
are exercisable by other States shall be subject to restrictions "re-
sulting from the exercise by the coastal State of its rights within
the area." The principal advocates of the doctrine of the exclusive
economic zone also maintain that this area falls within national ju-
risdiction and must not be regarded as high seas which by definition
are beyond national jurisdiction. Thus the Santo Domingo Declara-
tion expressly provides that "waters situated beyond the outer lim-
its of the patrimonial sea constitutes an international area desig-
nated as high seas ......
States which had earlier shown resistance to the doctrine of an
exclusive economic zone in the debates in the United Nations Sea-
24. See generally the Santo Domingo Declaration, and the Statements of
the Representatives of Malaysia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 12
(1974); Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 18 (1974).
25. Consider the Statement of the Representative of Honduras who main-
tained that the disappearance of the concept of the contiguous zone should
not entail the disappearance of certain traditionally related competences
which were complementary to the competence of states in the economic
zone. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 3 (1974); also the Statements of
the Representatives of Mauritania, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 23
(1974); Upper Volta, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 10; Nigeria, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.9, at 5 (1974). But contrast the Statements of
the Representatives of Portugal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22 at 6
(1974); and Switzerland, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 10 (1974).
26. Compare also the Statements of the Representatives of Zaire, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 15; (1974); Finland, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.2/SR.22, at 35 (1974); United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25,
at 18 (1974); Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 18 (1974); Italy,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 5 (1974); Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at 16 (1974).
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bed Committee, but which expressly endorsed it at the Caracas Con-
ference 27 appear on close examination, to have done no more than
adopt the terminology associated with the doctrine while still main-
taining the substance of their old positions. Thus, whereas the
principal advocates of the doctrine of the exclusive economic zone
would insist on the coastal State enjoying sovereign and exclusive
rights in relation to the exploration and exploitation of the natural
resources of the exclusive economic zone, the new converts would
neither grant genuine exclusivity to those rights nor recognize them
as being sovereign except in a very limited sense.28 This group
of States which has been aptly described as the "neo-traditional-
ists"29 is drawn from both developed and developing countries.
An outstanding case in point is to be found in the position of
the United States. Thus, the American proposal on the economic
zone and the continental shelf, although providing in paragraph 1
of article I that "the coastal State exercises in and throughout an
area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the eco-
nomic zone, the jurisdiction and the sovereign and exclusive rights
set forth in this chapter for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing the natural resources, whether renewable or non-renewable, of
the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters," proceeds to
emasculate the juridical content of the doctrine as conceptualized
and espoused by its principal advocates.30 For example, articles
3 and 28 of the American proposal are so formulated as to suggest
the existence of a rule of international law which gives foreign
States the right to erect installations or place objects on the conti-
nental shelf of a coastal State even without that State's express
consent for military and non-economic purposes. At this point it
would be convenient to advert to the similarity of content of article
7 of the six-power proposal.31 It is clear from the record of debates
27. See, e.g., the Statement of the Representative of the United Kingdom,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 19 (1974).
28. See, e.g., the Statement of the Representative of Byelorussian S.S.R.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.26, at 13 (1974).
29. See Statement of the Representative of Barbados, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/SR.22, at 19 (1974).
30. Consider in this context the Statement of the Representative of
Madagascar, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, at 12 (1974).
31. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L38 (1974) co-sponsored by six East-
ern European States, viz: Byelorussian S.S.R.; People's Republic of Bulgaria,
German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, Ukranian S.S.R.p id the US,S.R,
in Committee II, however, that a significant number of States in
the international community do not recognize the existence of any
such rule.32 In point of fact the Guyana representative advanced
the argument that in as much as the erection of installations or
the emplacement of objects on the continental shelf was the exploi-
tation of a spatial resource, article 2 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention (1958) would outlaw any such activity in the absence of
the express prior consent of the coastal State concerned. On the
question of pollution control, articles 5 and 8 of the American pro-
posal would restrict the coastal State's competence to establishing
"standards" and to taking "all appropriate measures in the eco-
nomic zone for the protection of the marine environment from pol-
lution and (ensuring) compliance with international minimum
standards for this purpose." It is necessary to note only in passing
that several developing countries are likely to construe these pro-
visions as incorporating unacceptable biases in favor of the techno-
logically-advanced countries. In the conception of the former, since
the current threat to the ocean environment caused by pollution
is a function of indiscriminate industrial development in the tech-
nologically-advanced countries, the applicable international stand-
ards should have a variable content designed to reduce significantly
pollution emanating from the industrialized countries and to en-
courage industrial development in the developing countries.38
Part II of the American proposal which deals with the question
of fisheries appears to underscore aequo vigore the illusory nature
of the sovereign and exclusive rights allegedly recognized as inher-
ing in the coastal State in the economic zone. In this context it
is significant to note that the exclusivity of the rights recognized
goes expressly to the 'egulation and not to the exploitation of the
fisheries within the economic zone.3 4 More important is the fact
that such regulatory powers as are recognized as falling within the
competence of the coastal State are hedged with qualifications of
an obligatory nature and which are predicated on inordinately sub-
jective self-serving notions about ecological interactions in ocean
space. Thus article 12 seeks to impose an obligation on the coastal
State for the purpose of conserving renewable (living) resource&
within the economic zone and to establish the principles to be ap-
32. See the Mexican proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.42 (1974)
which was subsequently co-sponsored by a large number of States.
33. The Statement of the United Kingdom Representative on the question
of agreed international standards of pollution control appears to confirm
the worse suspicions of developing countries in this context; see U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/SR.25, at 20 (1974).
34. See article 11 of the U.S. proposal and Statement of the U.S. Repre-
sentative, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24, at 13 (1974).
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plied in this regard. Article 13 imposes an obligation on the coastal
State to ensure the full utilization of (living) renewable resources
within the zone and to permit nationals of other States to "fish for
that portion of the allowable catch of the renewable resources not
fully utilized by its nationals."3 5 In the discharge of the latter obli-
gation the coastal State would be obliged to be guided by an order
of priorities established for the purpose. Article 18 would prohibit
the coastal State from catching fish of the anadromous species sea-
ward of the territorial sea except as authorized by the State of
origin. With respect to highly migratory species, fishing for these
in the economic zone would be subject to regulations established
by appropriate international or regional organizations (article 19).
Before terminating this cursory examination of the provisions of
the American proposal which deal with the question of fisheries,
it may be appropriate at this stage to remark on an apparent incon-
sistency in the text. It does appear from the above examination
that the main thrust of the American proposal regarding the exploi-
tation of living resources in the economic zone is in the direction
of recognizing no more than a preferential right on the part of the
coastal State. Yet part III of this proposal, which is concerned
with the continental shelf, recognizes the coastal State as enjoying
sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of ex-
ploring and exploiting its natural resources, defined in article 24
as including certain living organisms. This contradiction is, how-
ever, more apparent than real since the American proposal does
not attempt to assimilate the juridical status of the continental
shelf to that of the economic zone but keeps them separate and
distinct. In particular, this proposal does not envisage the conti-
nental shelf as necessarily coextensive with the outer limits of an
economic zone and in this regard is more in keeping with the posi-
tion advanced by several representatives.
36
III. EMERGENT, ELUSIVE OR VANISBING CONCENSUS
Against the background of the foregoing observations on the cur-
35. Compare this six-power proposal in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38,
at § 11 (1974).
36. See Statements of Representatives of New Zealand, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.21, at 3 (1974); Mexico, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR. at
7 (1974); United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 18 (1974).
But cf. Statement of the Representative of Khmer Republic, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at 6 (1974).
rent debates on the law of the sea, several tenable inferences may
be drawn concerning the concept of the exclusive economic zone.
In the first place, it may be argued that there was never really
any genuine consensus on the concept of an exclusive economic
zone; alternatively, it may be said that even if, at a given stage
of the debates, there was a fragile consensus it vanished in a
paroxysm of controversy generated by an enhanced awareness of
divergent particularistic interests; more optimistically, however, it
may be argued that there is an emergent consensus of a somewhat
fragile nature and which, if carefully nurtured in an atmosphere
of mutual accommodation, could develop into a viable understand-
ing.
Adverting now to the first inference, it does not appear on a care-
ful examination of the relevant debates that there is sufficient evi-
dence to support this proposition. Consensus, in the normal signifi-
cation of .the term, does not mean unanimity. Indeed, in the con-
text of United Nations forums the term is employed to describe
positive endorsement by an overriding majority accompanied by the
absence of unqualified rejection by the minority which may decide
to preserve the integrity of their own positions by entering appro-
priate reservations. Viewed in this light it cannot be denied that
there is still a genuine consensus on the concept of the exclusive
economic zone. Even the advocates of a two hundred mile terri-
torial sea have not rejected the concept outright even though they
continue to maintain that their own position is "the most logical
expression of an irreversible trend" towards the enlargement of
coastal State jurisdiction in the adjacent ocean space.317 Some other
territorialists have expressed an intention to insist on a territorial
sea of 200 nautical miles for the coastal State. This statement of
position, however, is informed by the apprehension that the neo-
traditionalists are not really prepared to compromise on the ques-
tion of the exclusive economic zone except to the extent of endors-
ing the terminology while embracing the substance of their old posi-
tions.38 It does appear to be the subject of a reasonable inference,
however, that given a willingness on the part of the neo-traditional-
ists to accept the concept of the exclusive economic zone in its orig-
inal signification, the reservations entered by these territorialists
would be abandoned.
But while conceding the existence of a genuine consensus on the
37. See the Statement of the Representative of Brazil, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/SR.26, at 3 (1974).
38. See the Statement of the Representatives of Guinea, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.28, at 9 (1974); Ecuador, U.N. Dloc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27,
at 14 (1974); and Somalia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR. (1974).
[VOL. 12: 600, 1975] Exclusive Economic Zone
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
concept of the exclusive economic zone it is not intended to deny
that that consensus is in danger of being eroded to a vanishing
point. Many patrimonialists and zonalists are on record as being
prepared to reconsider their own positions in the light of an ap-
parent intransigence on the part of the neo-traditionalists to re-
spond to the demands of current international realities. Some of
them represent states which have expressed their willingness to roll
back their jurisdictions in adjacent ocean space conditional on the
general acceptance of the exclusive economic zone concept.39 In
the upshot there is some indication of an inclination towards the
territorialists' position-an inclination which could be transformed
into a deluge of support if the neo-traditionalists maintain their
present position.
The foregoing observations would appear, therefore, to support
a finding for the third inference, namely, that there is an emergent
consensus in favor of the exclusive economic zone. What appears
to be necessary, however, is a determination of the precise param-
eters of that consensus and an examination of the possibilities of
its consolidation and enlargement. Concerning the first aspect of
the problem, two issues appear to be involved. The first goes to
the discovery of the least common denominator in terms of assess-
ing the measure of agreement on the substantive aspects of the ex-
clusive economic zone concept while the second goes to the qualifi-
cations expressed to be attaching to any agreement on substance
that may be identified.
In the context of the first issue there seems to be universal agree-
ment that developments generally, and in particular the applica-
tion of science and technology to the exploration and utilization
of values issuing from the ocean environment, have operated to
dramatize the irrelevance of much of the traditional law of the sea
in terms of the many demands of multiple uses and growing inter-
action in ocean space, and argue persuasively for the augmentation
of coastal State jurisdiction in adjacent ocean space. There is also
general agreement that the seaward limit of that jurisdiction should
be no more than 200 nautical miles as measured from the applicable
baselines for measuring the outer limit of the territorial sea.
39. See the Statements of the Representatives of Panama, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, at 7 (1974); and Tanzania, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
SR.23 at 3 (1974).
Within the economic zone, but outside the territorial sea, the coastal
State would recognize freedom of navigation as well as the freedom
of other States to lay submarine cables and pipelines. There is also
formal agreement that within the economic zone the coastal States
would have jurisdiction over fisheries and pollution. This summa-
tion appears to exhaust the constituent elements of the emergent
consensus on the exclusive economic zone.
A close examination of that consensus would show, however, that
its parameters are much more restrictive than they appear at first
blush. In the first place, there is no agreement on the extent of
the jurisdiction which the coastal State is to be recognized as com-
petent to exercise in relation to fisheries and pollution control.40
Secondly, there is no agreement on the extent, if any, to which
the coastal State is to be recognized as having control over scientific
research. More important, is the absence of agreement on the
status in law of the economic zone. Would the zone continue to
be regarded as high seas or would it be regarded as falling under
the national maritime jurisdiction of the coastal State? A resolu-
tion of this issue is crucial in determining what residual compe-
tences, if any, the coastal State is to be regarded as enjoying within
the economic zone. If, for example, the coastal State is to be re-
garded as having only those competences which have been expressly
conferred upon it under any new regime to emerge, any residual
competences would be recognized as inhering in the international
community and not in the coastal State. The question now to be
considered is whether such agreement as identified in the context
of the coastal State's competence within the economic zone could
be consolidated and enlarged upon or whether disagreement on the
issue of residual competences poses a real threat to the survival
of that fragile consensus.
In the present submission the resolution of this issue in a manner
satisfactory to all would depend on the degree of goodwill and mu-
tual trust which the current deliberations can generate and the
credibility of any system of disputes settlement which may be incor-
porated within the emerging regime. For the basic issue involved
here is the reality of the rights which the coastal State is to be
recognized as enjoying in the economic zone. Put another way, the
patrimonialists and zonalists will be satisfied with nothing less than
bankable guarantees that the rights recognized as falling to the
coastal State within the economic zone will be respected. This
would involve recognition of contingent competences indispensable
40. See, e.g., the Statement of the Representative of Lebanon in U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.28, at 18 (1974).
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to ensure the enjoyment of those rights. On the other hand, the
neo-traditionalists could have their worst apprehensions regarding
creeping jurisdiction allayed if given plausible assurances that such
augmentation of competences as may be recognized are both neces-
sary and reasonable, and that they would not be employed, as ex-
pedient, to transform the exclusive economic zone into a territorial
sea in the traditional sense. Thus, the issue as joined appears to
resolve itself by inference into the advocacy of extreme positions-
high seas versus ocean space within national jurisdiction. In the
present submission, this inferred statement of extreme positions is
both unnecessary and unwarranted and should not be construed
as inadmissible of a viable compromise along lines suggested above.
Turning now to the more important qualifications expressed to
be conditions precedent to the acceptance of the concept of the ex-
clusive economic zone, it is submitted that the main thrust of these
qualifications can be accommodated within stated positions without
necessarily jeopardizing the fragile consensus which appears to have
emerged or precluding its consolidation and enlargement. For such
an accommodation to be achieved, however, it would not only be
necessary to have mutual confidence in the integrity of positions
espoused and plausible guarantees to ensure continuing respect for
those positions, but also a quality of pragmatism that is responsive
to the genuine apprehensions of the advocates of certain stated posi-
tions. In general terms these qualifications relate to access to the
resources of ocean space and to the utilization of some of its more
important intangible values.
With respect to the first category of values, the enjoyment of
the renewable living resources of ocean space constitutes the most
immediate preoccupation. Thus, the neo-traditionalists are wont
to predicate their acceptance of the economic zone concept on a
right of access to the unutilized portion of the allowable catch or
maximum sustainable yield of the living resources of the economic
zone of the coastal State, subject only to identification of permis-
sible ceilings by regional or subregional regulatory fisheries com-
missions. To many patrimonialists and zonalists this qualification
is unreasonable and unwarranted. First, it is expressed to be based
on pseudo-scientific notions which can hardly bear scrutiny in the
light of current research into the behaviour of living organisms of
ocean space. In support of this position it is maintained that, given
the present stage of fisheries research, too little credible informa-
tion exists about the bio-dynamics of ocean space or about the eco-
logical interaction of species to validate dogmatic assertions about
optimum catch, maximum sustainable yield and the like.41 Sec-
ondly, in view of the fact that regional fisheries commissions have
to rely on data provided by nationals of countries seeking access
to the living resources of the economic zone in order to arrive at
estimates relating to optimum catch and maximum scientific yield,
such estimates are as vulnerable to self-serving distortions as pre-
vious and current computations whose unreliability is only
belatedly recognized at the point of extinction or near extinction
of particular species. It is urged further that since the continued
existence of living resources in the economic zone of a coastal State
is often bound up with the conscious incurring of opportunity costs,
that State should be regarded as the determinant of access to those
resources and of the conditions under which such access is to be
granted. In strictly dispassionate terms these submissions do ap-
pear to be sound. Equity and good sense would appear to demand,
therefore, that a solution be sought along the lines advanced by
the patrimonialists and zonalists leaving it open to enlightened self-
interest to prescribe responses that would not result in depriving
the international community of much needed ocean-based supplies
of protein.42 Already such enlightened self-interest has persuaded
the States of Asia, Africa and Latin American to make concessions
to the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States of their
regions in terms of access to living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. And whether current demands by some of the land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged States of these regions for
access to the non-living resources of the economic zone would per-
sist could very well depend on arrangements devised for sharing
the proceeds of exploration and exploitation of the resources in the
international area.
From the viewpoint of the principal maritime nations one impor-
tant qualification to the acceptance of the exclusive economic zone
concept is general agreement on a territorial sea of not more than
twelve nautical miles as measured from the applicable baselines.
This qualification is, however, expressed to be inseparable from the
condition relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea
as well as free passage through straits used for international navi-
41. See, e.g., the Statement of the Representative of Guyana in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.26, at 21-22 (1974).
42. Compare, e.g., the Statement of the Representative of the Ukranrian
S.S.R. in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 22 (1974).
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gation.43 Generally speaking, the first of these stated conditions
does not appear to present insurmountable problems. Difficulties
do arise, however, in connection with the juridical content of inno-
cent passage. In the first place the relevant provisions of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Geneva 1958)
leave much to be desired in terms of definition. In the result there
is no general agreement on the scope of the concept of innocent
passage from the viewpoint of the coastal State's rights and obliga-
tions.44 The extent of such disagreement as exists may be gleaned
from the reaction of States to the British proposal which was tabled
in Committee II at the Caracas session of the Conference.45 One
intractable issue to be resolved in this context concerns the spatial
application of this concept where progressive development as dis-
tinct from codification of the law is generally acknowledged to be
involved. If, for example, elements generally acknowledged to con-
stitute progressive development of the relevant law are involved,
should these elements have general application throughout a terri-
torial sea of twelve nautical miles irrespective of their effects on
the coastal State in terms of enlarging or contracting that State's
existing rights and obligations in respect of foreign vessels?46
Even more important from the viewpoint of the patrimonialists
and zonalists, should the regime of passage through the territorial
sea be assimilated to that of passage through straits and if not,
why not? In the submission of this group of countries no justifica-
tion exists for establishing a regime of free passage and overflight
through straits whose waters are comprehended by the territorial
sea and which are used for international navigation.4 The status
of the territorial sea in their submission should be the same regard-
less as to whether or not the waters in question comprehended
straits used for international navigation. What is said to be impor-
43. See the Statement of the United Kingdom Representative, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.2, at 8 (1974).
44. See, e.g., the debates in Committee I1 on agenda item entitled the
Territorial Sea in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.2-9 (1974).
45. This proposal is contained in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3 (1974).
46. See Statement of the Representative of Sweden, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/SR.12, at 9 (1974).
47. See the Statements of the following representatives: Democratic
Yemen, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.15, at 2 (1974); Kuwait, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.14, at 13 (1974); Algeria, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.
14, at 8 (1974); Nigeria, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.14, at 11 (1974);
India, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.14, at 19 (1974); also the proposal of
Oman in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.16 (1974).
tant is that the regime established for navigation through straits
accommodated the legitimate interests of the international com-
munity in expeditious and unimpeded navigation and this objective
could be effectively achieved by the regime of innocent passage.
The critical issue involved here turns on a credible evaluation
of community interests, and, in the absence of a highly organized
international community with an effective sanctioning process, such
an evaluation is more likely than not to be subjective. At present,
the maintenance of the tenuous nuclear deterrent balance is ex-
pressed to be based primarily on the swift and undetectable move-
ment and deployment of nuclear-bearing nuclear-powered sub-
marines given the sophistication of satellite surveillance in detect-
ing land-based nuclear installations. This circumstance explains
the demands of certain major maritime powers for free navigation
through straits used for international navigation. 48 But despite the
universally expressed interest in peace, differences concerning the
most efficacious method of securing this objective would continue
to persist and particularistic positions would always continue to be
espoused with considerable persuasive force. A pragmatic approach
to this problem would appear to require recognition of the fact that
a neurotic preoccupation with national security is a general charac-
teristic of all States; each of which will employ solutions subjec-
tively conceived as best suited to achieve this objective irrespective
of the disposition of States whose situations are considered as not
easily assimilable to its own. Such a pragmatic approach would
also recognize that the requirements of national security, whether
expressed in economic or military terms, have equal validity irre-
spective of the national conditions which prescribe the terms of
their expression. Granted the relevance of these perspectives, it
does not seem unreasonable to expect that negotiations conducted
in a spirit of give and take would assist the emergence of political
accommodations and that appropriate legal language could be de-
vised to give expression to them.
Another important qualification adduced by some principal mari-
time powers to be an indispensable condition for accepting the con-
cept of the exclusive economic zone relates to the incorporation of
provisions for a viable dispute settlement procedure. In the present
submission, this qualification should not present insuperable prob-
lems in terms of accommodation. Undoubtedly, the Eastern Euro-
pean countries have shown a traditional reluctance to accept provi-
48. Consider, for example, the Statement of the Representative of the
U.S.S.R., U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.12, at 2 (1974); and the proposals
contained in U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2 (1974), U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C,2
L.11 (1974) and U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.15 (1974).
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sions relating to the settlement of disputes that go beyond the pro-
visions of article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. Equally
true is the current reluctance of Third World countries to have in-
ternational disputes referred to international tribunals which are
committed to applying traditional interpretations of obsolescent
norms and composed of individuals whose orientation exhibits un-
acceptable biases in favor of traditional law. But in view of incon-
trovertible evidence tending to support a growing assimilation of
economic and political views of Eastern and Western Europe in a
context of detente and increasing collaboration between these
groups there is reason to surmise that the reluctance of socialist
countries to submit to third party adjudication of disputes has been
considerably eroded. Similarly, the erosion of the credibility of the
World Court within recent years and the increasing responsiveness
of the modern international law of the sea to the interests of new
States in the international community could operate to restore the
confidence of developing countries in other forms of compulsory
third party adjudication of disputes.
Addressing now the freedom of scientific research which has been
postulated as another condition precedent to the acceptance of the
concept of the exclusive economic zone, it does appear that diffi-
culties persist in terms of accommodating this requirement within
the emerging regime of the sea. The point is generally taken that
scientific research in ocean space is desirable and probably neces-
sary for man's survival on the planet. What is in dispute are the
conditions under which such scientific research should be con-
ducted. Stated in its simplest terms, the problem as it has been
presented so far appears to resolve itself into a choice between re-
stricted and unrestricted scientific research in ocean space. In this
connection, persuasive arguments have been advanced in favor of
both positions. On the one hand, excessive or unreasonable restric-
tions on scientific research in ocean space could frustrate the devel-
opment of ocean sciences to the detriment of human survival,
but, on the other, unrestricted scientific research in the oceans could
'be destructive of the very conditions of survival. The solution to
this dilemma would appear to lie in avoiding either extreme by
opting for regulated scientific research. This appears to be the ap-
proach contemplated by the patrimonialists who would recognize
the coastal State as competent to control scientific research in the
economic zone but would also place on the coastal State an obliga-
tion not to withhold consent unreasonably. It does appear that the
approach endorsed by the patrimonialists affords the coastal State
plausible assurances that industrial research would not be under-
taken in the absence of its express consent and on terms and condi-
tions established by it. On the other hand, the scientific community
could be assured that no malevolent attempts are being made to
obstruct the progress of science. That unrestricted scientific re-
search is socially undesirable in the light of our own experience
can hardly be contested. For even though it may be recognized
that scientific research is valuationally neutral per se and that its
valuational significance is almost entirely a function of the applica-
tion of such research, one is still confronted with the problem of
determining the most effective intervention point for the purpose
of establishing credible controls. And it is the subject of a reason-
able inference from the stated positions of the patrimonialists and
zonalists that their own preference in terms of an intervention
point is at the stage of conducting such research rather than at
the application stage. Given a successful accommodation of the
issue discussed above, there is room for optimism regarding the sat-
isfactory resolution of the remaining outstanding issues which
touch on pollution control, the extent of the continental shelf, the
spatial relationship of the economic zone to archipelagic waters and
the structure of the regime and machinery for the international
area. On the question of pollution, accommodation will have to
be reached on the establishment of permissible levels of pollution
(probably incorporating differential criteria based on the stage of
development of states), enforcement jurisdiction, state responsibil-
ity and compensation for damage. A solution to the problems relat-
ing to the spatial extent of the continental shelf and the economic
zones of archipelagic States may be found in the sanctioning of dif-
ferential enjoyment of access to and sharing in the proceeds of the
resources of the international area. And finally, acceptance of the
concept of an exclusive economic zone in the sense of the patrimon-
ialist or zonalist approach could very well enhance the prospects
of accommodation of issues touching on the structure of the regime
and international machinery for the area beyond national jurisdic-
tion.
In the present submission, agreement on the economic zone ap-
pears to be critical in determining the overall success of the con-
ference.49 For, rightly or wrongly this concept in its original for-
mulation is viewed by the overriding majority of States in the inter-
49. See the Statement of the Representative of the Ivory Coast, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.25, at 19 (1974),
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national community as constituting the point of departure for the
elaboration of a new regime for the oceans that would accommodate
its multiple uses while achieving that balance of conflicting inter-
ests best calculated to preserve the integrity of the ocean environ-
ment on which so many life-supporting systems of the planet de-
pend. What now remains to be done is to consolidate and enlarge
the area of consensus on the exclusive economic zone concept in
order to establish a solid foundation on which to build the new
law of the sea.
